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At the time of the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in the cities, which was climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia, the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering of cattle. In Hupeh,[23] in one month of 1950, 88 rural robberies were reported, in which 49 military cadre were killed and 264 cattle were slaughtered. In Kwangsi Province during 1950-51, over 3,000 Communist cadres were murdered.[24]

In connection with the maintenance of rural order, at least two important measures were taken. One was the suppression of the landlords and the other was the establishment of rural security committees. Prior to the issuance of the directive by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, landlords in the rural areas were placed under the authority of the military command and the militia. According to the order concerning the punishment of landlords issued by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee[25] in November 1950, those who resisted land reform were to be tried by the People's tribunal. Those sentenced to life imprisonment or to imprisonment

23. Report of Li Hsien, Yangtze Daily, April 25, 1951, p. 5.

24. Official report of P'eng Chen, ibid., Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.

25. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1.

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for five years or more were sent to "Reform-through-labor" camps. Those receiving sentences of less than one year were placed under the control of the hsiang government. They were required to sign "patriotic compacts" and pledges. They then were placed in custody, deprived of the right to travel and the right to receive guests, and were compelled to engage in productive activities. A directive in August 1952 provided that landlords could be sent to any area[26] where forced labor was in demand.

The establishment of security committees in the rural areas was a measure taken upon completion of land reform to organize mass participation in public security work. A committee[27] consisting of three to eleven members chosen from activists in various organizations is elected at a mass meeting in each village. Teams of activists are formed under each committee to establish an intelligence network in the village and in industrial groups. These security committees, incollaboration with the Party, the judicial organs, and the mediation committees established in the rural areas, form the backbone of the security system.

3. Public Security in the Cities. The maintenance of public order and safety in the cities is more complex than in the rural areas. The Communists approach this problem from at least four different

26. Ibid., Aug. 20, 1952, p. 1.

27. Yangtze Daily, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 1; ibid., Dec. 4, 1951, p. 3; text in Current Background, No. 216, Oct. 21, 1952.

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B. Counterrevolutionary Decrees

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According to Communist interpretation, "counterrevolutionaries" are persons who engage in activities contrary to the interest of the state. This term specifically includes bandits of all kinds, landlords, "despots," spies, Kuomintang intelligence agents, former high-ranking Nationalist officers continuing to engage in counterrevolutionary activities, and members of secret societies.

The provincial regulations on the suppression of landlords who attack the land reform, issued by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee[39] in September 1950, was the first counterrevolutionary decree of its kind. "Acts of resistance" include the "spreading of rumors," attempts to avoid the paying of taxes, and acts against the successful completion of spring plowing, summer collection, and autumn harvest. Landlords or other persons engaged in setting forest fires, killing cattle, and destroying farm implements are liable to penalties as severe as life imprisonment or death. No appeal of any sort is permitted in these cases. A supplementary regulation,[40] issued by the same committee in November 1950, deals with the establishment of People's tribunals for the trial of landlords.

39. Yangtze Daily, September 15, 1950, p. 1.
40. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1.

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Regulations on the suppression of counter-revolutionaries[41] were first issued by the Government Administration Council in February 1951. These regulations are said to be based on the "spirit" of Article 7 of the Common Program, which registered the determination of the Communist regime to punish all counterrevolutionaries and "other criminals" and to impose upon the "Reform-through-labor." Counterrevolutionaries are those who collaborate with foreign imperialist powers, assist them in actions against the state, instigate mutiny in the militia and armed forces, or organize secret societies. Counterrevolutionaries are subject to trial both by the People's courts and by the military tribunals. Former members of political parties, including the Kuomintang, the Chinese Youth Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, former intelligence personnel under the Nationalist regime, the officers above the rank of captain are required to register with public security agencies.[42] Their political rights may be withheld for a period of time, depending on their past activities, their property may be confiscated, and they are subject to political surveillance.

The control of counterrevolutionaries is made possible by two laws published by the regime, the law of control of counterrevolutionaries and regulations governing "Reform-through-labor." The

41. Yangtze Daily, Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.
42. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1951, p. 1.

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July 1952 law concerning counterrevolutionaries was issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council.[43] Decisions on the means of suppression of counterrevolutionaries can be made either by the People's court or by the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. In the villages, hsiang and ch'ü governments may initiate this control, subject to the approval of the public security agencies at the county level. Likewise, sub-stations in the city may also initiate control, subject to the approval of public security sub-bureaus. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. The period of surveillance may be three years or less. During the period, the individual is sent to a forced-labor camp.

The regulations governing "Reform-through-labor," issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provided a detailed scheme for the establishment of forced labor throughout China.[44] This centralized management no doubt facilitates control of counterrevolutionaries, but it imposes undue hardships and cruelties upon them.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

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The reliance upon the use of terror and force for the maintenance of "public order and safety"

43. People's Daily, July 16, 1952, p. 1.
44. Ibid., Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

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Such reports point to the possibility that even today the richer elements in rural communities may still constitute a disturbing influence as far as the Communists are concerned

C. Kuomintang Elements and Spies

After the "bandits" and "landlords" were brought under control, the Communists in Central-South China launched in 1951 the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement. It was carried out in three stages: (1) first was the so-called "administrative suppression" stage that stressed the dissolution of "counterrevolutionary organizations"; (2) the second stage was devoted to the arrest of counterrevolutionaries after mass meetings. At these meetings, accusations were made and past injustices reviewed. Most of the arrests were made on the basis of these accusations. (3) The third stage called for the registration of the remaining counterrevolutionaries with public security agencies so that they could be kept under constant surveillance and arrested, if necessary. Although no reliable survey on the number of counterrevolutionaries arrested and executed is available, judging from the intensity and the scope of the movement, the number must have been large.[8] For example, during an unspecified ten-month period in 1950-51, the Communists reported in Kwangtung Province alone the execution of 28,332 people out of 89,701 arrested.[9]

8. For additional information, consult Hu-nan Fei-ch'ing [Hunan Under Communist Rule], and Chiang-hsi Fei-ch'ing [Kiangsi Under Communist Rule], published by Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party in Taipei, in 1954, 1955 respectively.

9. Ku Ta-ts'un, lt. governor, Kwangtung Province, reported these figures in Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Sept. 10, 1951, p. 1.

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1. Extermination of the Remnants of Nationalist Troops

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As has been mentioned, by the end of 1950 most of the remnants of Nationalist troops in Central-South China collapsed as a result of repeated Communist assaults. Some of them, however, managed to escape to the mountains and remained at large. The Communist round-up of these men resulted in the arrest and execution of 44 in[10] Kwangsi Province, early in 1951. They were accused of having served as regimental or other high-ranking commanders in the Nationalist Army, and now commanded new rebellious armed bands. These bands were known as "Anti-Communist National Salvation Armies," "Anti-Communist Self-preservation Columns," "Self-preservation Guerrilla Columns," and "Southeast Asia Democratic Allied Forces." The bands were small, and no attempt had been made to consolidate them under a single command.

2. Liquidation of Former "Counter-revolutionaries"

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The Central-South Military and Political Committee issued a directive in October 1950, stressing the need to investigate persons who had committed crimes against Communism in the past, and mistried cases involving such people. As of July 1951, according to incomplete statistics, 7,598 such mistried cases had been investigated and disposed of in this region.[11] The amazing speed with which they

10. Yangtze Daily, May 5, 1951, p. 1.
11. Yangtze Daily, July 27, 1951, p. 3.

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were handled seems to indicate that the investigation process was used by the Communists as a device to suit their own convenience. In Heng-yang (Hunan Province), Ch'ao-chou, and Swatow (Kwangtung Province) Administrative Districts, there were 5,865 cases investigated and disposed of in a very short time.[12] Before the "trials" took place, the usual Communist pattern of holding mass meetings had been called in 315 villages in the Shang-jao Administrative District, Kiangsi Province alone.[13] Some 120,000 people participated in such meetings.

3. Roundup of Saboteurs

Scattered cases of sabotage have been reported in the Communist press from time to time. It is hard to determine if any organized groups of saboteurs were at work, but the Communist provincial governors and Public Security Bureau chiefs alike blamed all cases involving sabotage on "counter-revolutionaries." These "criminals," the Communists said, burned granaries, killed draft animals, in order to disrupt farm production, and ambushed Communist militia in the countryside so as to create unrest in rural areas. In the four months beginning October 1950, a total of 4,371 cases of sabotage were reported in the rural communities of Central-South China.[14]

The Communists paid particular attention to sabotage in factories. Severe penalties were imposed on those charged with destruction of factory equipment,

12. Ibid., July 27, 1951, p. 3.
13. Ibid., August 22, 1951, p. 3.
14. See report by Pu Sheng-kuang, head of Public Security Department of the Military and Political Commitee, Central-South China Region, in Yangtze Daily, April 17, 1951, p. 1.

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those who spread rumors to demoralize the workers, and those who organized strikes. At the launching of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953, labor discipline was tightened up and security committees were strengthened in all factories. These measures, however, failed to eliminate sabotage in factories. As late as May 1955, a strike which disrupted industrial production in that area and brought death to two of the strike organizers, was reported in Wuhan.[15] Another report said that from 1949 to 1954, cases of sabotage in factories and business enterprises in ten major cities in China totaled 11,094. Of these, 7,278 were discovered before major damage was done; 2,039 were serious cases involving industrial accidents caused by saboteurs; the remaining cases involved destruction and/or theft of factory equipment.[16]

4. Extirpation of Spies

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The arrest and execution of many people accused of being Kuomintang intellence agents were widely publicized. Such people included the former personnel of Nationalist intelligence organizations, government agencies, and officers of the Nationalist armed forces. Cases involving former members of a joint Sino-American intelligence agency during World War II were given special publicity. Take the case involving I P'ing-chen and Liu Ming-hsia, for example.[17] Both had received training in intelligence work in the United States during the war. It

15. Shih Ch'eng-chih, "I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien Ta-lu Jen-min Ti Fan-K'ang" ["The People's Opposition to Communism on the Mainland in 1954"], Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], No. 106, January 10, 1955, pp. 61-63.

16. People's Daily, Peking, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 6.

17. Yangtze Daily, March 21, 1951, p. 1.

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was played up in the Communist press to arouse public hatred against Americans. However, as Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of the Ministry of Public Security of Communist China, admitted[18] at the end of the suppression campaign, of the cases prosecuted in 1951, the majority of them involved bandits, and only a few had anything to do with intelligence agents.

Vigorous though the Communist efforts to eliminate the Kuomintang spies may have been, there are indications that the Communist have not yet succeeded in eliminating espionage. Reports from Mainland China early in 1954 revealed the existence in Central-South China[19] of at least two organizations which the Communists regarded as engaged in work. One was the Ch'ing Feng She, the other the New Socialist Party of China, which was said to have its own "underground army" operating in Hunan Province.

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Foreign missionaries and the church groups sponsored by them also came under fire as the Communist spy-hunt gained momentum. One case was reported in 1951 in the administrative district[20] of Hsing-ning and Mei-hsien (Kwangtung Province). An American missionary, accused of being a spy himself, was charged with abetting "counterrevolutionary" Chinese in espionage work for the United States government. Immediately after this exposé, a wave of similar cases was reported in the Central-South China press.

18. People's Daily, Peking Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.
19. People's Daily, March 9, 1954, p. 3.
20. Yangtze Daily, April 24, 1951, p. 1; similar cases were reported on April 25, 1951, p. 3, and July 21, 1951, p. 3

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D. Secret Societies, Gangsters, and Vagrants

Secret societies in China are generally characterized by their resistance to social changes dictated by a central authority. Their different origins and motives of organization notwithstanding, the above-mentioned common characteristic alone is enough to place all secret societies in China under Communist attack.

In Central-South China, the Communists made use of the land reform in an attempt to destroy secret socieities in the rural areas. In the cities, the Communists instituted a "democratic reform" in April 1951 to dislodge groups and cliques in control of labor organizations. The "democratic reform" was carried out in consonance with three slogans issued in succession by the Communists. The first slogan -- anti-feudalism -- called for a violent, frontal attack on existing secret societies and obsolete labor union leadership (labeled as "bossism"). The second slogan urged "democratic unity" among the rank and file in labor organizations. The third slogan emphasized the theme of "democratic management," which meant that Communist-dominated labor unions were to be organized to replace the old ones.[21]

Measures employed by the Communists during the Democratic Construction Movement were similar to those used in the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries. A large-scale propaganda drive was launched to arouse public feeling and was

21. Yangtze Daily, July 21, 1951, p. 1. For provincial report on this movement, see article on Kwangtung in ibid., November 26, 1951, p. 2; also on Hupeh, ibid., April 25, 1951, p. 5; and Kwangsi, ibid., November 28, 1951, p. 2.

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followed by many types of mass meetings. As labor unions were disbanded, their leaders were accused of abusing laborers. As to secret societies, many of their leaders were put to death. Some active members of such societies managed to escape death, but not constant police surveillance; others were sent to forced labor camps.

Two types of secret societies were included in the target of Communist attack. One type consisted of relatively small groups centered around a few individuals. These bore the brunt of the Communist assault at the beginning of the campaign. Samples of this type of society were found in the First Textile Factory and the T'ien-ho Mining Company in the city of Wuhan.[22] These groups were known under such names as "Thirty-six Friends," "Seventy-two Hsiao," "108 Fighters," "Eighteen Lo-han," "Ch'ing Pang," "Hung Pang," "Hsiung-ti Hui," and "Tzu-mei Hui." Secret societies of this type were formed mainly on the basis of personal relationships and had little or no religious observances.

The other type of secret society found in Central-South China included the I Kuan Tao, Sheng Hsien Tao, T'ien Men Tao, and Ta Tao Hui. The word tao shared by the first three organizations implies a religious veneer. While all four groups are wide-spread, the I Kuan Tao has become the central target of Communist fire because of its large scope of operation.[23] Started originally in North China,

22. Yangtze Daily, July 26, 1951, p. 1.

23. Shih-shih Shou-ts'e [Current Affairs Handbook], No. 4, December 1950, pp. 77-81; No. 6, January 1951, pp. 38-43.

this secret society spreads gradually to other regions of China. In 1954, the Wuhan, Huang-p'i, Hsiao-kan, P;u-ch'i, and Hsien-ning areas in Hupeh Province were the centers of I Kuan Tao activities.[24] Among the conditions of existence advocated by this group are "anticipation of world disaster," and "avoidance of action." Although this doctrine seems to be no more than passive resistance to Communist indoctrination, the society has been accused of having aided the Japanese during World War II and presently working for the Kuomintang against the Communist regime. The exact strength of these secret socieities is not known, but it is understandable that in view of the Communist violence, the theme of passive resistance as advocated by the I Kuan Tao must have a great appeal to the troubled populace in Central-South China.

Vagrants, habitual thieves, and gangsters are also slated for elimination by the Communist regime because they contribute to unrest and are therefore potential counterrevolutionaries. No specific statistics have bee compiled by the Communists on these "dregs of society," but reports on the "Reform-through-labor" program have indications as to the approximate strength of these groups. (See chapter on Forced Labor.) In announcing their success in dealing with the undesirable elements, the Communists have indluced arson and sabotage among the crimes committed by these undesirable groups.

II. CORRUPTION AND OTHER ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO THE REGIME

As early as 1950, the Communists in China were

24. Shih Ch'eng-chih, loc. cit.

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voicing alarm at the prevalence of corruption, inefficiency, waste and theft of government properties, and other "unhealthy conditions" throughout the country. Steps were taken to correct these conditions. The following is a summary of the development from 1950 up to early 1955.

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A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns (1950-1952)

Corruption in government and the Party was first brought to light by the 1950 Communist "rectification movement: designed to halt so-called "bourgeois bureaucratic tendencies." Failure of this movement necessitated the inauguration of the Three-Anti Campaign. Launched personally by Mao Tse-tung in November 1951, this campaign was aimed at corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. Many cases were uncovered in Central-South China.[25] The branch offices of the People's Bank in this region was reported to have spent more than twenty million yüan (US$1,000) for entertainment of the participants at one meeting. The Finance Department of the regional government spent seventy million yüan (US$3,500) for a month-long conference. In the Yangtze Navigation Bureau of the Department of Transportation, the sum of thirty billion yüan (US$300,000) was appropriated for repairs, but the fund was later spent on the bureau personnel. Employees above division heads in this bureau were issued watches, fountain pens, and other luxury items for personal use. Probably the most corrupt organization in this region was the Department of Public Security, which was noted for its misuse of of public funds.

25. Yangtze Daily, January 7, 1952, p. 1.

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Many officials were implicated in the corruption cases. In the Bureau of Taxation at Wuhan, about 200 civil servants were found guilty of corruption during a mass meeting soon after the start of the campaign.[26] High officials, incluing Pu Sheng-kuang (Chief Procurator of the Central-South Branch of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, concurrently chief of the Department of Public Security for this region), was exposed and ordered to resign.[27] Ch'ien I-min, deputy to Pu, was similarly removed from office. Wu Te-feng, mayor of Wuhan, was accused of dereliction of duty. The embezzlement of billions of yüan ended the public career of the chief of the Non-ferrous Metal Administrative Bureau, who was concurrently the deputy chief of the Department of Industry of this region. Even agencies having little to do with finance and economy were not free from corruption; Liu Hung, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department in the Kwangsi provincial branch of the Communist Party, was accused of embezzling sixty million yüan (US$3,000) from public funds.

While the Three-Anti Campaign was aimed at government and party officials, the Five-Anti Campaign, instituted a few weeks later, had business and industry as its main object of attack and sough to eliminate bribery, tax evasion, theft of government property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of economic information for private speculation.[28]

26. Ibid., January 14, 1952, p. 1.
27. Ibid., March 9, 1952, p. 3.
28. For a record of these two movements in Central-South, see Li Hsüeh-feng"s report in Yangtze Daily, September 29, 1952, p. 1.

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Businessmen accused of being criminal during the Five-Anti Campaign were severely punished. Ts'ui Ming-ch'ing, division chief of a state-operated department store, was tried for embezzling sixteen billion yüan (US$900,000).[29] Because his accomplice, T'eng Chen-lu, was a merchant, the case was cited by the Communists as an example of how a government official could be led astray by an unscrupulous businessman. A similar case involved Ho Heng-fu, chairman of the Wuhan Industrial and Business Association and a high-ranking government official, who was accused of conspiring to smuggle gold, foreign notes, and strategic materials. He was tried and sentenced to death.[30]

Although the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were launched separately, their aims and results were the same in many aspects. Since Party members were, in most cases, administrative officers, the impact of the campaigns upon the Party and upon its administrative agencies was equally great; since state-operated enterprises and administrative agencies were imbued with private enterprise, attacks on businessmen affected administrators and Party members. The intensity of these campaigns should not be underestimated. The repercussion engendered by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were in every way comparable to those of other major "suppression" campaigns launched betwen 1950 and 1952.

B. Subsequent Measures (1953-55)

There were indications that corruption and other activities detrimental to the regime did not cease at the conclusion of the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in May 1952. According to an incomplete set of figures compiled by the Ministry of Commerce

29. Yangtze Daily, January 19, 1952, p. 1.
30. Yangtze Daily, April 10, 1952, p. 1.

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of the State Council, 1,268 corruption cases involving 1,826 people were prosecuted during the first six months of 1954.[31] The 1955 Supervisory Conference devoted a great deal of attention to a study of this issue.[32] A flood of reports on corruption and waste appeared in the Communist press. One of the most serious cases involved the Mining and Geological School in Changsha, Hunan Province, which was accused of misuse of government rations. The school was reported to have wasted rice rations and falsified personnel statements in an effort to obtain more government rations.[33]

All of these reports indicate that, despite persistent efforts to eradicate corruption, abuses both in and outside the government continue to occur.

III. TENSION AND DISCONTENT

Extreme centralization and control of governmental, economic, and social activities logically lead to discontent and tension. If not checked in time, these undercurrents of public dissatisfaction may create a real threat to the government.

A. Public Discontent

1. Restrictions on Private Life

In Central-South China, as in all other regions of China, the individual citizen cannot choose how his day is spent; a fixed schedule has been imposed on him. After his working hours, the peasant, for

31. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 24, 1955, p. 1.

32. For report on conference, see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, June 13, 1955, p. 1.

33. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 16, 1955, p. 1.